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Introduction: Some Obvious Points 
The topic of foreign investment in Latin America is so fraught with 
misunderstandings and emotional overtones that it seems wise to start with 
some generalizations on which agreement is almost assured. This will be fol­
lowed by a look at some misconceptions in this field. The paper will close 
guessing at future trends. 
Latin American policies toward direct foreign private investment (DFI) 
arise, at a given point in time, mainly from the interplay of circumstances 
in the world economy with a given Latin American country's needs at its 
stage of development. The historical experience of each country will also 
weigh heavily on the host country's perception of benefits and costs of 
foreign investment. 
A key feature of the world economy of the 1960's was the existence of 
several major centers of capital and modern technology, such as the U.S., 
Western Europe, Japan and Eastern Europe. This situation opened the way 
for a gradual breakup of old commercial "spheres of influence", and the creation 
of a competitive and multilateral world trading community. Recent difficulties 
in the world monetary system show that there are important adjustment problems 
on the road to that free-trading, multilateral goal. Furthermore, one may 
fear that the very rapid expansion of large multinational corporations (MNC's) 
could, in a few years, turn that relatively competitive world market into 
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one dominated by a handful of oligopolies, controlling both finance and 
trade. One cannot dismiss a priori either the fear that the l970's will 
witness a return toward protectionist neo-mercantilism nor the scenario 
where an expanding world economy is managed from a few boardrooms located 
in New York, London and Tokyo.
1 But I still find more likely an extension 
into the 1970's of the (on the whole) healthy 1960 1 s competitive trends 
in world commerce and finance. 
For Latin American, of course, this would be very fine indeed. The 
major Latin American countries are entering fairly sophisticated stages 
of industrialization, not very far behind those of Italy~ Spain and 
Eastern Europe, at which point selected foreign technology in specific 
activities can be helpful. The more potential suppliers of that tech­
nology, the better. 
Most Latin Jl.merican countries are also keenly aware of their need to 
~xpand and develop new, or non-traditional, export lines, a task which 
would be difficult or impossible in a stagnated world economy, and costly 
in one dominated by few oligopsonistic buyers. 
But besides the need for advanced technology and new export outlets, 
Latin .American countries have kept alive their old aspiration to consolidate 
their political and cultural independence by greater control over their 
economic life. Most of these countries are getting ready to join the 
Atlantic and world communities as full-fledged members, without the need 
of 11special relationships a with hegemonic powers. Such a transition, of 
course, is not without (at least short term) costs. Concessional aid, 
for example, may gradually become a thing of the past for the more advanced 
Latin .American countries (although donor countries, regardless of Latin 
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.American decisions 9 may cut if off anyway!). This more stand-offish, 
business-like attitude is what one could expect as Latin .America approaches 
the per capita income levels of Southern Europe within a multilateral world 
economy. Note also how the traditional dependence of Latin American exports 
on the United States market has declined from an unusually high 49 percent 
of the total in 1952, to 42 percent in 1958 and to 34 percent in 1968. 
One could go further and put forth the hypothesis that when DFI ex­
pressed as a percentage of host country's total assets, or in per (host 
country) capita terms, reach 1.high ;: levels, sharp and violent political 
reaction is veriJ likely to be generated, Mexico in 1910, Cuba in 1959, 
and Canada (and Puerto Rico?) in 1971 shared that characteristic. 
Under these circumstances, I expect that most Latin .American countries 
will increasin1:;ly ask, not whether DFI is intrinsically 1:goodiv or /ibad 11 , 
but rather which investments fit better into host country's needs and plans, 
and under what conditions can one obtain those investments. Few would 
argue with the proposition that DFI can, under certain circumstances, benefit 
both investors and host countries. Today we see some socialist countries 
of Eastern Europe expanding their agreements with foreign capitalistic firms, 
while the popular front government of Chile has certainly not closed the 
door to all DFI, as witnessed by its automobile policy. 
But it is also true that DFI, under present Latin American conditions, 
will not automatically yield results favorable to host country development. 
It is not only that, as the Indians of both North and South America found 
out~ and as put by Ragnar Nurkse: 11Foreitsn business investment is not 
always a happy form of encounter between different civilizations. 112 In 
the words of another distinguished economist, it is also noted that: 
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11 
••• since private international capital movements are motivated by expected 
net private return, and since the relation of net private return to gross 
social return is heavily influenced by truces and other governmental policies, 
there is no a priori reason for placing much confidence in the principle 
of freedom of private international capital movements as a guarantor of 
economic efficiency in the international allocation of world investment 
3resources. n 
In other words, if foreign investors can borrow from host country's 
credit resources at interest rates which are often negative in real terms, 
make profits sheltered behind effective rates of protection which reach 
100% and above, benefit from holidays and exemptions from import duties on 
their raw materials, and remit profits abroad at overvalued exchange 
rates, there may be doubts as to the net benefits which the host country 
receives from such an activity. 
This ma~r or may not be typical of a given country at a given time. 
But it warns us that in the area of DFI, whether one deals with its 
economics or its politics, there is a great need for careful empirical 
analysis and cool pragmatism. Contrary to the usual stereotype, emotionalism 
and false heroics on this issue are not limited to Latin Americans only. 
Some U.S. Ivfisconceptions Regarding DFI in Latin America 
Hith distressing frequency, U.s. publications (even hardnosed business 
publications) and commentators use a disturbing rhetoric when dealing 
with the topic of U.S. investments in Latin America. Latin .American leaders 
who argue for some new restriction on DFI, are q_uickly labeled 
17anti-foreign 11 
or 11 anti-American;;, without giving the reader an idea whether the regulation 
makes sense or not, and whether the one-to-one association of a particular 
business with the U.s. national interest is justified. If these publications 
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used the same standards to report U.S. economic news, one can imagine their 
editions after President IJixon 's August 15th, 1971 speech. They would 
have ran headlines of the following sort: "Xenophobic Republican Boss 
announces Pearl.Harbor in Reverse--Anti-European steps also Taken li. 
This may seem like an exaggeration. Yet, this last May, The New York 
Times, no less, ran a story announcing that the Argentine government was 
reversing 11 i ts shrill policy of economic nationalism';, and had ousted 11the 
. . f .,4xenophobic Minister o Economy, Aldo Ferrer ... · It so happens that Dr. Aldo 
Ferrer has a long and distinguished inte~national career, particularly in 
Inter-American institutions. As a senior adviser to the Inter-American 
Committee on the Alliance for Progress, incidentally, he wrote a paper on 
the role of foreign investment in Latin American development jointly with 
that other well···•knmm nxenophobe '', Dr. Roberto Campos of Brazil. 5 
Parts of the statements by the Council of the A~ericas on the new 
foreign investment code of the cou.7.tries participatin,'.s in the Andean Common 
Market represent another example of overreaction and purple rhetoric. They 
also contain threats which are worse than offensive: they are not credible. 
As put by the Vice-President and general counsel of ELTRA Corporation of 
Hew York in a recent article: 
•.• a sense of detachment could have prevented the Council 
of the Americas, representing major U.S. business interests 
in Latin America, from coming forth with the hasty and 
inaccurate statement that the 'fade-out joint venture' 
formula is an 'unworkable and unrealistic proposal on the 
basis that foreign investors do not invest to go out of 
business'. There are any number of modalities of I doincs 
business', and if U.S.businessmen cannot prove versatile, 
surely those from Hestern Europe and Japan will!6 
To this one could add that the symbolism of pictures showing Fiat 
. . . 
trucks being produced in Ford I s old asse:r.1bly plant in Chile should not escape 
U.s. firms. More tangible i2 tl1e fe,ct tr.cat ten European and Japanese auto­
makers recently answered Chile I s call for bids to form partnerships; 
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in which the Chilean government would mm at least 51 percent of the 
equity. 
New forecasts or threats of a 1idrying-up 11 of willingness to invest 
sound particularly hollow when one reads about new contracts of Occidental 
Petroleum Corporation and other U.S. investors (not to mention non-U.S. 
investors) with Peru, less than three years after the air was filled with 
the same warnings motivated by the Peruvian-I .P. C. quarrel. Perhaps private 
settlement of that dispute has been reached~ but to the naked eye it looks 
as if Peru has backed down less than the investing community. Mexician 
history, of course, provides other similar examples. 
But perhaps the most spectacular rhetorical fireworks belong not to 
the private but to the public sector. Latin Americans who during 1969 
read in the opening lines of the Rockefeller Report on the Americas that: 
"We went to visit neighbors and found brothers", heard recently that high 
U.S. officials, talking :pres11i--nably about those same neighbors, say that 
11711We don't have any friends there anyway. 
It is not entirely clear why the topic of DFI arouses such strong emotions, 
not only in host countries, but also in investor countries. It may arise 
partly from confusing foreign investment with pure foreign aid, in spite of 
the clear fact that DFI has to do with business, risk, and profit, not 
charity. Another possible reason for exasperation at measures which restrict 
DFI inflows into Latin America is summarized in the question: 11How can 
a developing area, which is capital-poor, reject it?n The question, 
however, admits many answers. First, as noticed earlier, the major con­
tribution DFI can make to the present stage of Latin American development 
(in most of the countries) is not really as a supplier of capital nor 
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foreign exchange, but as a provider of specialized techniques and talents. 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, host countries should desire something 
more than an indiscriminate increase in the inflow of the packages of capital, 
technology and skills associated with DFI. They should try to control, in 
particular, the allocation of such an inflow, as well as the conditions 
under which it is contracted, so that the social return of the investment 
to the host country will exceed its costs. Of course, these calculations 
are not always carefully done, but on principle we are back to the need 
to analyze each project, and such things as its contribution to developing 
local technology, better knowledge of marketing channels, effects on local 
entrepreneurship, etc. Thirdly, even when there is a positive net return 
to the host country from a particular DFI project, that country may not 
allow it for the sake o~ minimizing foreign presence in its economy, or in 
some sector of it. Surely, this is a trade-off every sovereign country 
has a right to choose; in fact, not all members of the Hestern community 
have the same degree of openness to DFI, and this is no impediment to 
mutually prnf'i t.1:1hlF> trade and other financial links. 
One also reads in the U.S. other arguments regarding DFI which dim 
rather than increase understanding. It is, for example, sometimes pointed 
out that, after all, total earnings of U.S. investments in Latin America 
have averaged only 12 percent of the bookvalue of that investment, a not 
exploitative figure. (The data for these calculations are obtained from 
company balance sheets.) This figure by itself, I am afraid, casts very 
little light on DFI issues. T-Je all know about accounting conventions; in 
particular, there is considerable worry in Latin .America about over-invoicing 
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of imports from headquarters to subsidiaries, especially in pharmaceuticals, 
royalty and patent payments, etc., as ways to decrease book profits in 
host countries and increase them at headquarters. It has been noted in 
several countries that some plants show year after year accounting losses, 
and yet headquarters makes further investments into them. The problems 
raised by intra-corporate sales and pricins techniques are, of course, not 
limited to Latin American-U.S. relations; furthermore, they do not always 
work to the disadvantage of host countries, as it appears in the case of 
oil.
8 But the point is that one should not debase discussions regarding 
DFI using book profit rates carelessly. 
Another line of thought which I find mystifying is one which implies 
that those wishing to control DFI are only or mainly "elite groups n, bent 
on increasing their own power and status, :i.f necessary at the expense of 
the masses. ;\Jo doubt those types exist in Latin America ( and elsewhere). 
But even stretching the use of "elite groups" into the realm of tautologies, 
the argument will give a dangerously misleading impression of Latin American 
feeling on this issue. The Venezuelan and Chilean Congresses, both democra­
tically elected and encompassing many ideological groups, have recently 
passed with near imanimity laws which restrict foreign investment in oil 
and copper, respectively. One could say that everyone in Congress is a 
member of the 11elite", and acts mainly to work out his own impulses and 
psychic needs. Does anyone really believe that? 
If the "elite II hypothesis were correct, one would expect moves to broaden 
political participation to improve the investment climate. Such a move 
seems to be occurring in Argentina this year, and here is how it has been 
reported from Buenos Aires: 
For United States investors here, who have an esti­
mated one billion dollars at stake, the news of the lifting 
of the ban on political activity last ihursday night has 
raised some gloomy prospects. 
There is hardly any banned-until-now political party that 
does not favor a sharper nationalist course at the expense of 
foreign interests.9 
One may note a sharp contrast: while the historical record of DFI 
is very much alive in the Latin American mind, it tends to be ignored or 
downplayed in the U.s. It is an inevitable fact that in social history 
the sins of the father will haunt even the innocent son, and a greater 
historical perspective in the part of U.S. observers could be helpful for 
taking a more detached view of day-to-day DFI crises. U.S. publications 
are not incapable of taking such a detached and long run view of DFI 
frictions between investors and host countries; I just find them more per­
ceptive and cool when dealing with, say, the relations between Koreans 
and Southeast Asians and Japan, or between Algeria and France, than those 
between Latin llmerica and the U.S. In fact, they can sound downright enthu-
10
siastic about Algerian and Asian reactions to the French and Japanese. 
If nothing else, the coexistence in time of many different ways "of 
doing business n should give some perspective in facing Latin American 
changes in the rules of the game for DFI. From reading the U.S. press one 
gets the clear impression that the investment climate for foreign corpora­
tions is better in Rumania and Yugoslavia, and even in the USSR, than in 
most Latin American countries. At first, this sounds crazy. On second 
thought, it illustrates the simple point that in the field of DFI the direction 
of change often gets more attention than the average level of treatment. 
Rough guidlines with a gradual tendency to become softer seem to be preferred 
to weak ones tending erratically to get tougher. If this is so, in most of 
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Latin .America things will get worse for traditional United States investors, 
before they get better for those willing to operate in the new climate. 
Some Latin .American Misconceptions Regarding DFI 
The case for closer control over DFI is not helped by fallacious or 
misleading arguments which one often hears from Latin .American sources, or 
from those sympathetic to Latin American aspirations. The prize for con­
fusion in this area has to go to the 
0 decapitalization;' or the lithey-take­
out-more-than-they-put-in.; argument. 
This argument compares the amounts of fresh DFI inflows for a given 
period with outflows for profit remittances, dividends, etc., generated 
by the stock of DFI established in the host country. It is pointed out 
that the latter sums exceed the former for Latin ft.merica; the implication 
is that DFI is bad for the region, draining it of its surplus, and, therefore, 
the region would be better off without DFI. -' 
Note that this line of thought compares fresh investments with outflows 
generated by old investments, and says nothing regarding the allocation 
and output (or surplus-eeneration) of those investments. Suppose, for 
example, that in a given country accumulated DFI is $100 Million and it is 
all located in the export sector producing every year $30 Million of exports • 
Suppose further that during the last fifteen years no new DFI-has-come _in, 
but. profit remittances have amounted to :µ10 Million per year. It will 
then be argued that the host country will have been 
11 decapitalized" by 
$150 Hillion during that period, and that profit remittances have exceeded 
the original investment. This is "bad". 
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Compare the previous situation with another, where for fifteen years 
new DFI has come in at a rate of ~~10 Million every year, and that no profit 
J 
remittances have taken place yet. Presumably this is "good.:, even though 
the investments may all go to produce Coca-Cola and Corn Flaltes, at domestic 
prices twice as high as those in the world market. 
The point is that the often-given comparison of fresh DFI with profit 
outflows is useless to judge whether or not a given country is benefitting 
from DFI. If the rate of new DFI inflows is constant, and the rate of 
profit annually remitted abroad is positive, sooner or later outflows will 
exceed inflows. And if the period is made long enough, the sum of annual 
profits or interest on a given investment will always exceed the original 
sum put in, whether one talks about DFI or a personal savings account. 
This will happen in DFI which may be, for other reasons, good, bad or 
indifferent for host countries. 
If the host country's economy is diagnosed to be limited primarily 
by an acute foreign exchange constraint, the direct and indirect balance 
of payments effects of DFI, and not only inflow minus profit outflow, should 
be brought in, including its impact on exports and net import-substitution, 
~ measured at world market prices. But more generally, other economic 
effects will have to be taken into account, in a full benefit-cost analysis, 
in trying to assess how DFI will change the host economy. That a given 
proJect saves or generates foreign exchange, or does not, should not necessarily 
be a decisive reason to accept or re,ject the proposal. One should also 
be on guard against the danger, noted by Benjamin I. Cohen, that fresh 
DFI in export lines could create new enclaves of small net benefit to host 
economies. 
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Joint-ventures have many features appealing to host countries, when 
compared with those of fully-owned subsidiaries of MHC I s. But insistance 
that all DFI must come in the form of joint ventures can have significant 
costs, under present world market circumstances •11 Some MNC's simply will 
not touch joint venture and may be more interested in investing in industria­
lized countries ( including Eastern Europe) than in bargaining with LDC' s; 
this may not matter much when there are several potential investors in the 
field (Gl-1/ autos) , or when the I-1.NC main asset is a brand-name of doubtful 
social product (Kelloggs), but can delay entrance into specialized fields 
(IBM/computers). Other \'iNC's may be persuaded to give in to joint-ventures 
especially when the host country has a large domestic market, but at the 
price of letting them charge the mixed offspring higher sums for technology 
:from headquarters. Those MNC' s also generally show less zeal in promoting 
exports from their joint-ventures than from their fully-owned subsidiaries. 
Under the cover of good-will, they use more local and less foreign credit, 
and their retained earnings are lower. Their contribution to local entre-
preneurship can be more apparent than real if rigid rules encourage phonY; 
or induce drawing on experienced>local partners. Finally, some foreign 
investors may quite eagerly seek joint ventures in the hope of obtaining 
favorable treatment in tax and other matters which can be very onerous to 
host economies. In short, willingness to enter into joint ventures will 
not necessarily separate 11good\l from 11bad11 MHC's from the host country view­
point, and very rigid rules in this area can involve important opportunity 
costs, both because of vhat is kept out and of what comes in. But let me 
grant the difficulty in separating 11very rigid rules n from nrealistic 
rules of thumb a. 
In the Latin lll11erican ambiance it is tempting to believe every story 
putting the forei:.;n investor in a bad lic;ht, and to support every scheme 
to reduce his profit. Yet clearly there are 1)etter and uorse uays of doinr; 
the latter) fron the viewpoint of host country's uelfare, as emphasized 
by Paul P. Streeten; higher uages for privilegec. uorLers of , ·:1c' s are less 
desirable in general than hie;her taxes vhich can :Jenefit via nublic 
expenditures lar~er and less favored groups in the population. Foreign 
investors may beco:me exasperated at a nev charge acainst then: that they 
pay wages which are too higt! Jut in fact the charc;e, uhich should be 
extended to host cou.'1trJ labor policies, has some substance, especially 
in countries ,rith a •Tidespread unemployment problem. And, obviously, keeping 
facts straight is a precondition for sensi"'ole decision--meldng. (Before 1959 
it was widely believed in Cuba that foreicn oil companies had actually 
discovered vast amounts of oil in the islnnd, but t~wir ·;-;orld-,ride 
strate1:;y led them to kee:J t 11ose discoveries secret, as reserves. /ilas, the 
story nou appears untrue) . 
nnm.,,~t.i (' T,at,-in AmPri ~An ;·JP.eds and. Their Influence on Po].j.cies Toward DFI 
nuch experimentation is r,oing on in Latin America regarding policies 
toward DFI. Brazil relies on public c0Jr1.mand of monetary, fiscal and foreign 
exchange policies to control DFI, and uses :positive!, incentives and measures 
to induce opening up of closed companies, foreign and national, to public 
participation. The Andean countries, on the other hand, have adopted a 
code uhich calls for tighter regula.tions over DFI. Some of the smaller 
countries, devoid of much barr,aining pmrer, desperately try to induce 
inflous by "wide-open" rolicies, takinc full-pase ads in The j:Jeu York Times 
which produce embarrassment to other Latin A~ericans. Cuba continues to 
have nothing to do Fith any DFI, follouinr: a spartan (but not laconic) 
style. There are, furthermore, numerous pro:9osals on ,:rhat to do about 
DFI. Even in a given Latin American country, V1e social, political 
and economic needs are many and often conflicting, pushing policy toward 
DFI in different directions, and frequently in contrary ways for different 
sectors within the same country. Father tlrn.n survey this vast and hetero­
geneous field, this section vill discuss briefl:." some sectoral and general 
trends which seem in need of greater clarifice,tion. 
The felt need to control basic sectors of the economy uill be enough 
to maintain the pressure to nationalize, one ,-ray or another, major foreign­
o~med activities in the field of traditional natural resources, especially 
when such activities 9-,re of key importance to the host country. As ex-
President Eduardo Frei has recently put it: 
The degree of a\:areness and development reached by 
these nations has led them to feel that it is against their 
interests and their very identit~,r to allo1-: natural resources, 
which are essential to them either as rau materials for their 
industry or as prime export items in their economies, to remain 
in foreign hands. Thus, the nationalization of these resources 
will be unavoidable ...12 
Ever since the colonial :powers plundered the mineral and natural resource 
wealth of Latin .America, startin,-::; in the 16th century, Latin Americans, 
have felt that they were not getting a high enough share of the pure rents 
generated by those God-given natura,l resources. furthermore, and granting 
that the prices at vhich those resources may be sold in ,rorld markets may 
remain erratic, most countries do not wish to maintain a situation where 
one more (to them) exogenous force, the foreir;n corporation, can introduce 
decisions affectine, ti.1eir control of foreign exchan1::e receipts, regarded as 
an elementary precondition to rational :,lanning. Those feelings should not 
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be impossible to understand in the U.S. , vhere Alaska uants to own and 
operate the oil pipeline which will dominate its economic life, where 
Puerto Rico is pressing copper corporations for more favorable deals, and 
,rhere Iiontana legislators complain that Anaconda
I s New York leadership 
treats that state like a colony. 
So every shift in bargaining power can be expected to be used by 
NoteLatin .American countries to push a little further to,rnrd local control. 
to DFI, has skillfullyhov Venezuela, which 14 years ago was ·\ride open n 
used Liddle East circumstances to gain a e;reater share of its oil and 
gas revenues, as well as greater control over t;mt industry. The history 
of Chilean copper is another example, more complex, of this trend. 
The production and mari(etinr; of certain natural resources, such as 
oil, copper and aluminUI;J., generate high gross profits which are the result 
of two separate influences: :-~1ure rents from rich naturs.l denosits, and 
the oliga;,olisti c control of t:-1e industry. As a first approximation, 
one may vie," the sharing of pure rents as a conflictive zero--sum game between 
host countries and foreie;n corporations; both countries and corporations, 
however, have a common interest in not allowinc; too much competition in 
the industry. Because of this and other reasons, one can expect that 
forei~n companies will continue playing some role in this field. For 
example, althoush the Chilean copper situation is still unclear, Cerro 
Corporation :may end up not only settling amicably with the Chilean government, 
but could also provide technical help to the nationalized copper mines of 
that country. But clearly, the days of the 99-year concessions are gone 
in most (but not all!) of Latin A.merica. 
If host countries feel confident that they can now run old export 
lines, based on natural resources, they are likely to uelcome some foreign 
investment for the sake of expanding new or non-traditional exports, parti-
cularly in manufacturing, but not excluding agricultural activities nor 
11new11 natural resources, lil':.e timber or iron ore. (1,n1at is a new natural 
resource in one country may be an old one in another.) Over the long run 
Latin American countries, acting jointly if possible,, would do well to 
,
devote resources toward developing their own marlc:eting channels and outlets, 
and picking up expertise in the sale of non-traditional exports. But 
that process may take some time, and in the meanwhile the ready-made facilities 
of Ml'JC' s for world-wide connections loom appealing. It has already been 
reported, for example, that IE:- was in 1969 the largest exporter of manu­
factured goods from both Argentina and Brazil. Even here, however, the 
bargaininr; will typically be tougher than sixty or twenty years ago; if 
nothing else, there are now more foreicn investors who can be induced to 
bid for export pro,jects, as the Tionroe Doctrine carries over less and less 
to economic matters. 
There is a danger in too close a link-up between new Latin American 
exports and DFI. Investing countries may be tempted to condition access 
to their markets to favorable (discriminatory) treatment to their investors 
in exporting host countries. This is one, among many reasons, why a system 
of hemispheric preferences would be far inferior to a generalized trade 
preference scheme. (It is hard to visualize Japanese-Latin American joint 
ventures tapping much of the U.S. market under hemispheric preferences.} 
And I would add that it is also inf~rior to just freezing trade restrictions 
at their pre-Au~ust 15, 1971 levels. Latin America has too much to gain, 
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both economically and politically, from a non-discriminatory world trading 
community, to toss away multilateralism for the sake of some short term 
advantage, 
It is known that the process of import substitution has been rather 
disorderly in most Latin ftJnerican countries. In some sectors, duplication 
of plant facilities behind excessive protection lead to unused capacity, 
inefficiency and high costs. Often, as in automobiles and other durable 
consumer goods, foreign investors are conspicuously present and have not 
always re.frained from clamoring for :9rotection. There is a great need 
for rationalization in this area, and in ma.riy cases it is likely to come 
via direct government action, rather than more slowly workinG market forces. 
Argentina, Chile and Peru have recently taken steps to rationalize their 
auto industry •13 This could lead to frictions, but it must be borne in 
mind that some kind of rationalization in high cost, excessive capacity 
import substituting activities is quite desirable from the viewpoint of 
economic efficiency. 
There is indeed the n~ed to re-think in Latin America the whole traditional 
policy of protectionism. It is not only that it has yielded excessive pro­
tection; it has also lacked a clear set of objectives. Protectionism 
typically leads, at least in the short run, to inefficiency in the use of 
resources, as well as to income red:istribution in favor of the protected 
entrepreneurs, at the expense of the rest of society. It is possible that 
,,.infant entrepreneurs 11 will eventually justify those subsidies by their 
"learnine; by doing". Eotice that I put the emphasis on entrepreneurs, not 
on industries. If this is accepted, I see little to justify Latin American 
countries subsidizinf; foreign entrepreneurs in protected industries, as 
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those foreign entrepreneurs are hardly 'iinfants ,: , and, by definition, 
are in activities which cannot pay their mm way without protection. 
Protected industries, if they are going to be encouraged at all, should then 
as a rule be reserved to national entrepreneurs to be, so to speak, their 
The sametraining ground, and in that way justify their social cost. 
would apply to special subsidies to protected industries via credit, tax 
rebates, etc. Ideally, effective tariffs, or the tariff-equivalence of other 
measures, should be gradually lowered even to infant-entrepreneurs, but 
while they remain, say above 20 precent for a given activity, that activity 
should be reserved to national entrepreneurs, unless very special circum­
stances or national objectives dictate otherwise .
14 Furthermore, national 
entrepreneurs who in the past have benefitted from protection would not be 
allowed to sell out to foreign investors, unless they return to the national 
Treasury the accumulated difference between the effective protection they 
But I suspect that the unpopularity ofreceived and the 20 percent limit. 
this proposal among foreign investors will be easily exceeded by the 
enthusiasm with which it will be rejected by Latin .American protectionists. 
Another illustration of the need for closer coordination between 
DFI and protectionist policies is 13iven by bans of 
11 luxury" imports leading 
to their domestic production by foreicn firms. A rationale may be given 
for banning soft drink imports while allowing the establishment of a Coca­
Cola plant within the country, but such rationale is likely to be weak. 
{Even when they do not receive protection, one may doubt the usefulness to 
the host country of DFI whose major strength is a world-famous brand name 
for manufactured consumer goods created by persistent advertising.) 
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A rationalization of protectionist policy would also help to check 
another negative influence exerted by foreign business on Latin American 
economies, this time not through DFI but through meretricious peddling 
of capital goods. 1,1ore than one Latin American white elephant has been 
conceived in unholy marriage between heavily protected local entrepreneurs, 
often managers of public enterprises, and unscrupulous foreign, very 
frequently European, suppliers of machinery and equipment. 
The previous paragraphs should be enough to dispell the notion that 
because more and more of DFI is going to promote Latin American industria­
lization, in contrast with old-fashioned DFI in export-oriented natural 
resource exploitation, the need to control DFI has lessened. From a purely 
economic viewpoint, in fact, it may well be that the nold-fashioned
11 DFI 
provided greater benefits to host econo~ies. 
Latin American ability to generate domestic savings has outstripped 
its capacity to produce indigenous technological advances, and even to 
apply knowledge available from the rest of the worla.. But it is strongly 
felt that this is no reason to neglect a close scrutiny of royalty and 
patent agreements, not all of which are deemed to bring in desired 
knowledge at least cost. Government revision of royalty agreements between 
Colombian and foreign firms is sa~d to have successfully reduced outward 
payments without sacrificing the technological inflow over the last few 
years. The Colombian regulations on licensing technological transfers 
markedly influenced the relevant parts of the Andean foreign investment 
code. Now Argentina has also introduced comprehensive regulations in this 
field, adding the interesting twist of requirinG fees for technological 
transfers to be based, not on sales, but on the profits of Argentine firms. 
-20-
These measures can partly be interpreted as attempts to improve ho
st 
country bargaining power in areas where international markets are t
hin 
and imperfect, and where the lmowledge of those markets in the par
t of 
Just the fact that the newindividual Latin American firms is weak. 
regulations state that all patents, trademarks and agreements for s
ale 
of technology will have to be registered and approved by the govern
ment, 
improve the negotiating position of local firma vis-a-vis foreign s
uppliers. 
I am told that many a Colombian firm has hinted to that country's c
ommittee 
on ro.1alties their willingness to have proposed agreements rejected
 by 
the government, for the sake of a second bargaining round with fore
ign 
suppliers. Such committees also keep tabs on the costs to host co
untries 
of technological transfers from parents to subsidiaries, and can re
ject 
agreements which restrict the freedom of host country firms to exp
ort, or 
to buy foreign goods from the cheapest source. In other words, the
y also 
serve as a mild form of anti-trust, combatting clauses which act in
 rest,raint 
of free trade, Note ~hat these measures go beyond trying to deal w
ith 




.Another obvious way in which Latin American countries can increase 
their bargaining power is by acting jointly in negotiations with fo
reign 
investors, so as to avoid self-defeating competition among themselv
es. 
Remember the history of corporate regulation within the U.S., when 
the 
New JerseyMassachusetts law was undercut by competition from ·•1oose 
II 
and Delaware, or note the pointless recent competition among states
 of 
the U.S. in their tax laws, which has eroded their tax-base withou
t much 
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16net effect on total investment. These considerations provide the rationale 
behind the desire of countries forming the .Andean Common Market to have 
common foreign investment guidelines. Just as such a market, in its early 
stages, calls for a common minimum external tariff, it makes sense for it 
to have some kind of a common minimum code for DFI. 
Behind the trends reviewed in this section, one can detect not only 
"growing nationalism11 , but alsc growing sophistication in the part of Latin 
.American policy makers, even though the new regulations can sometimes 
substitute new irrationalities for old ones. Of all the 11gaps•i separating the 
developing from the developed, one of the widest has been the gap in 
knowledge and bargaining 0 know-how 11 when a host country sat to negotiate 
with a foreign investor (witness the neeotiations between post-Sukarno 
Indonesia and foreign investors). For Latin America this gap is narrowing 
and hopefully one will soon see in each country scores of officials trained 
in both foreign business schools and. even in MNC' s, who then put their 
experiences to work for their countries by negotiating new contracts 
with foreign investors. There is much Latin America can learn from a close 
study of the modus operandi of the r.mc 's, even where the development 
model being followed is one hostile to the philosophy of MNC's. 
All of this implies that in the future no empty references to the 
"sanctity of contracts" should impede a flexible approach to recontracting 
and renegotiations, as new circumstances emerge in host countries and in 
the world economy. The concept of renegotiating contracts is hardly novel 
for the industrialized countries; note, for example, frequent Pentagon 
renegotiations with its contractors; Note also how scores of labor contracts 
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as well as international commitments had to be put aside by the Presidential 
announcement of August 15, 1971. But this takes us into the subject matter 
of the next section. 
U.S. and International Reactions to Latin .American Policies toward DFI: 
Minimizing Friction 
Latin .American policies toward DFI, old and new, are very likely to 
remain the major source of friction betveen the U.S. and Latin .America 
for the foreseeable future. There is no issue where differences in the 
inellectual and emotional climate, North and South, are more marked. 
With other foreign investors, such as Europeans and Japanese, with fewer 
investments, less historical deadweight and more modest hemispheric political 
roles, the climate is better, although not exempt of tension. (My 
colleague Benjamin Cohen tells me that South Koreans view U.S. investors 
very much in the same light as Latin .Americans view the Japanese.) 
While friction is, in the nature of things, inevitable, it need not 
lead to apocalyptic results. Let me first look at some recent events in 
this field 9 and conclude with some re.flections on a few ideas which may 
avoid over the long run a rerun, on a more massive scale, of the Cuban­
U.S. hysterics of 1959-61. 
A first thing to note is that U.S. policies in this area during 1969 and 
1970 were quite reasonable, under the circumstances. One can cite the non­
application of the Hickenlooper ammendment in the IPC-Peruvian dispute 
and, going outside the region, the quiet diplomatic settlement of 
disputes between U.s. investors and Algeria. The "low profile" had a good 
chance of becoming a successful U.S. Latin .American policy, in spite of 
misguided criticism of it as 11do-nothing". Better steady "do-nothing" 
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than the previous unstable mixture of warm rhetoric, some tied aid, and 
an occasional invasion. 
Unfortunately, during 1971 and the 
11 low profile" appears to be changing 
to an ugly, tough one. The symptoms have been: 
{l) Threats to use international and bilateral concessional aid 
as a weapon in disputes between U.s. business firms and Latin .American 
governments. This goes beyond even the Hickenlooper amm.endment, which 
at least gave some 
11grace periodn for settlement, and left multilateral 
organizations out of those disputes. 
(2) Denial of access to near-commercial credit, such as that 
provided by EXIMB.AHK, to countries which were in the process of negotiating 
settlement with foreign investors. While that type of credit is not an 
inevitable component of international transactions in goods like commercial 
airplanes, it is sufficiently common to make the denial or postponement of 
a routine request come close to economic boycott. 
(3) After much talk of trade preferences, in fact granted earlier 
this yea;r by Europe and Japan,
17 and in spite of substantial and steady 
U.S. trade surplus with Latin .America,
18 new Latin American export drives 
were dealt a blow, whose negative psychological impact is perhaps more 
important than its real incidence, by the 10% import surcharge annotmced 
by President Nixon this August 15. It would indeed be ironic if after years 
of preaching the need for export-promotion in Latin .America by many people, 
including international and U.S. aid agencies, and just when the message 
is getting through, the major industrialized countries turn protectionist. 
Is the fate of Latin America to be always out of step, turning away from 
the world market when it is booming, as during the post war, and toward it 
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just when it turns protectionist? At any rate, Latin American export­
pessimists received much ammunition by the August 15th anneuncement. 
These are very disturbing symptoms, one could almost say provocations, 
which could unleash an unfortunate cycle of reprisals and counter-reprisals, 
leaving both sides politically and economically worse off at the end, and 
destroying institutions and rules of the game within which mutual adjustments 
can occur. 
Over the last few years, several proposals have been put forth to 
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smooth the tensions which exist between MNC's and host countries . A 
few ideas arising from those proposals, and some new ones, may be mentioned. 
One hears how truly "multinational" U.S. corporations with foreign 
investments are becoming, and how this trend represents a great advance over 
narrow nationalisms. But if at every sign of friction with a host government 
those companies run to enlist the power of the U.S. government on their 
side of the fight, their claim to 11multinationality
11 will be regarded, with 
good reason, as hollow. Private foreign investors cannot have it both 
ways ( for very long) • In a way, this point reflects the very old mistrust 
of conservative economics for mixing up in shady proportions government 
with private enterprise, which should apply,,. to international as well as 
national busin~sses. It suggests that government inte?W"ention in this 
area, via institutions such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), either do too little or too much. If the U.S. government deems 
that certain foreign investments do clearly involve the U.S. national 
interest, then the U.S. government should become an open and declared 
partner in the venture, and should take clear responsibility for every 
aspect of the contract. This is what the French government does, as I 
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understand it, with French investment in oil. During the oil crisis of 
1970-71, private oil 1-TI'.'lC's took on a quasi-public role, and the U.S. lifted 
anti-trust regulations so they could present a common front. Similar 
considerations could apply where DFI provides industrialized countries 
with access to raw materials deemed strategic, for which open and com­
petitive markets may be impossible even to imagine. But for those foreign 
involve the U.S. national interest unambiguously,investments which do not 
then the U.S. government should leave risk taking as well as profits fully 
to the private entrepreneur. 
Even under such narm's length 11 relationship between government and the 
foreign investor, it is not unreasonable to expect that the U.S. government 
will not remain totally indifferent if the existing business of one of 
its citizens is systematically abused and plundered abroad. India, after 
all, shows concern over the treatment received by second- and third-generation 
Hindus in Africa, and Chile watches over her emigrants in neighboring 
Patagonia. But it is dangerous to use receptivity to fresh DFI as criteria 
to discriminate among countries in matters relating to trade and aid. There 
is nothing in the post war multilateral rules of the game, as embodied in 
organizations such as the GATT, and IBRD and the IMF, which encourages 
a close link between trade and investment preferences. Even within the 
common market made up of the 52 United States, while there is free trade 
in goods and free movement of labor, there remains a considerable amount 
of state legislation which limit the operations of banks and other 
financial institutions. Similarly, the world community should be able 
to create an environment in which each sovereign country can trade inter­
nationally as much as it wants and can, while reserving its right to follow 
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more restrictive policies regarding the capital account of its balance 
of payments. Furthermore, it does not make much sense for foreign investors 
to become all worked up about new restrictions over DFI which a Latin .American 
country may impose, when it is known that similar practices are tolerated 
by foreign investors in countries like Yugoslavia, Rumania, Japan and Sweden. 
The 1971 international monetary crisis has dramatized the fact that 
not even the Atlantic community is yet ready to become an noptimum currency 
11 asarea , within which capital flows would be as smooth those between London 
and Manchester. Greater future reliance on more flexible exchange rates 
and/or tighter controls over the capital account of the Balance of Payments 
is likely among many industrialized countries. In this setting, it is 
particularly anachronistic to press LDC's for relaxation of their regulations 
over certain types of capital flows. 
A key characteristic of DFI is that it puts together into an indivisible 
package capital, technology, management skills, information about foreign 
markets, etc. Economists know about the inefficiencies created by "tied 
sales 11 , and anyone who believes in the benefits of free competitive markets 
should be able to support efforts to give LDC's more options, by creating, 
probably at low real costs, alternative and separate markets for each of 
these elements. 
In the first place, international private capital markets for LDC bonds 
should be expanded and strengthened, facilitating access to them by those 
countries wishing to rely less on concessional aid and DFI. The expansion of 
international capital markets during the 1960 1s, and the degree of economic 
maturity reached by many Latin .American countries make this option a promising 
one for the 1970 's. If Hungary can tap the Eurobond market, at least the 
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seven largest Latin .American countries should be able to do the same in 
growing amounts. 
International organizations such as the IBRD, the IADB, and the IFC 
have done remarkably little in the field of technological transfer. They 
could step up their efforts to act as clearing houses of information 
regarding where LDC's could obtain technological inputs in the cheapest 
way, and not necessarily tied to capital transfers. The socialist countries 
could be brought in to participate more actively in those licensing markets. 
International and regional organizations could also be more involved 
in backstopping for LDC's in their search for information when those 
countries are in the process of negotiating with foreign investors. Unfortu­
nately, the practices of some of those organizations have in fact been perverse 
in the past; using the excuse that international private capital was available, 
they have refused to lend for host country investments in certain sectors, 
such as oil. They have thus abstained from helping to diversify not only 
the sources of capital, but more critically, the channels through which 
Latin America has access to modern technology and information about the 
state of particular world markets. 
Professor Charles P. Kindleberger has called for a sort of GATT to 
regulate MNC 's, as well as to serve as an international Ombudsman, charged 
with preserving competition, avoiding inconsistent national regulations of 
MNC's and for resolution of conflicts. If sponsored by the United Nations, 
such an institution could be most useful in avoiding many of the difficulties 
we have reviewed. The idea, incidentally, is far superior to similar ones 
which have been proposed, but which restrict participation to Western 
Hemisphere nations. It is also superior to proposals for a multilateral 
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investment guarantee scheme operated collectively by all OECD members. 
Such a scheme comes close to providing a framework for an investors' cartel. 
Indeed, this is exactly the reason why recently The Economist of London 
20advocated that plan. 
The ideas reviewed in these last paragraphs are meant for the long run, 
and SB¥ little about thorny transitional disputes between Latin .American 
countries, foreign investors and the U.S. When viewed in the midst of 
battle, those disputes can be exasperating and dismaying, although exhilarating 
for those in search of confrontations. v·lhen gloomily contemplating such 
panorama, it is comforting to review the record of French-Algerian relations. 
After a bloody war, many frictions an~ manoeuvres, including going to the 
brink earlier this year as well as trying to bring other parties into their 
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disput e, they seem to have worked out a civilized and mutually profitable 
arrangement. Surely the U.S. and Latin America can do even better. Indeed, 
the end of total U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere could open the way for 
a genuine improvement in U.S.-Latin American relations. 
Footnotes 
* .An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on "Trade 
and Investment Policies in the Americas 11 , October 7-8, 1971, Southern Methodist 
University, Dallas, Texas. Comments from Benjamin I. Cohen and Richard N. 
Cooper are gratefully acknowledged. 
1. See testimony of Stephen Hymer in Part 4, 11The Multinational Corporation and 
International Investment 11 , Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic 
Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, (Washing­
ton: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 906-ll. 
2. Ragnar Nurkse, "International Investment Today in the Light of Nineteenth­
Century Experience, i: reprinted in Richard l:J. Cooper, Editor, International 
Finance (Penguin Books, 1969), p. 367. 
3. Harry G. Johnson, "Theoretical Problems of the International. Monetary System," 
also in R. N. eooperj Ed., International Finance, Op. Cit., p. 315. 
4. The New York Times, Ma;y 31, 1971. 
5. "Inversi6n Extranjera y Desarrollo Econ6mico Latinoamericano (Versio'n Pre­
liminar), 11 by Roberto Campos and Aldo Ferrer, Washington, D.C., December 26, 1967 
(mimeographed). 
6. Laurence Bi:r-ns and Robert H. Luum,bury, 11T'ne Art of Survival in Latin America," 
Columbia Journal of World Business, Volume VI, Mum.ber 4, July-August 1971, p. 43. 
7. The Rockefeller Report on The Americas, The Official Report of a U.S. Presi­
dential Mission for the Western Hemisphere, by Nelson A. Rockefeller (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1969) , p. 17 (Preamble) ; and The New York Times, August 15, 1971. 
8. For an interesting discussion of problems raised by _intra-corporate sales 
techniques see Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Inter-Dependence: Economic 
. Policz in the Atlantic Community (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), pp. 101-05. 
Cooper suggests a test which perJ:1a-ps can be applied to Latin America. and 
-2-
and U.S. data, and consists of inquiring whether for specific activities, 
book profitsrates are higher for parent firms with Latin American investments 
than for comparable firms without such investments. 
9. The New York Times, April 5, 1971 
10. See for example the articles entitled "The Ugly Japanese?" in The Wall 
Street Journal, May 12, 1971, and r,A foreign legion routs the French," in 
Business Week, May 8, 1971. On the other hand, French publications become 
highly emotional on Algeria, but take an almost amused tone when dealing 
with U.S. DFI difficulties in Latin America, as does The Economist of London, 
which, however, loses its cool over Middle East oil, saying things like: 
Once upon a time , had a group of backward countries, 
with highly unstable governments and a reputation for per­
sistent commercial bad faith, tried to hold the western 
economies to ransom as the oil producing governments of 
the Middle East are now doing, they would have seen the 
gunboats steaming up the Gulf in double-quick time 
(Editorial, January 30, 1971) 
11. This discussion of joint ventures draws heavily on the work of Louis T. Wells, Jr. 
of the Harvard Business School. See in particular his unpublished paper 
"Effects of Policies Encouraging Foreign Joint Ventures in Developing Countries". 
12. Eduardo Frei Mont alva, 11The Second Latin .American Revolution, 11 in Foreign 
Affairs, 'Volume 50, Humber 1, October 1971, p. 89. 
13. See 11 Car Output Laws in Argentina, Peru, Chile to Give Nations more Control 
of Industry, 11 in The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1971. 
14. For more on this point see my "D5.rect Foreign Investment in Latin America," 
in Charles P. Kindleberger, Editor, The International Corporation {Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1970), especially pp. 325-29. The 20 percent limit is, of 
course, arbitrary; it is assumed that the rea,1 exchange rate in the host 
country is not too out of line with the 11 equilibrium 11 one. 
-3-
15. See the impressive work of Constantine V. Vaitsos, i;Transferencia De Recursos y 
Preservacidn De Rentas Monopol::i:sticas 
11 
, in Revista De Planeaci6n y Desarrollo 
(Bogota', July 1971, Volume III, Number 2, pp. 35-72. 
16. See Richard N. Cooper, liNational Economic Policy in an Interdependent World 
Economy," in The Yale Law Journal, Volume 76, Number 7, June 1967, pp. 1293-
1297. The use by states and municipalities of their privilege to float 
tax-exempt securities for the purpose of raising funds for new businesses 
locating within their boarders is another example of harmful competition 
among political units. 
17. My colleague Richard N. Cooper, in a recent unpublished paper, argues 
that the EEC scheme for generalized tariff preferences will offer, in fact, 
very little additional incentive to exports of developing countries. But 
at least that scheme will consolidate LDC gains in the European market, in 
contrast with the threat of backsliding implicit in the U.S. measures. 
18. For many years, Latin American complaints about a negative trade balance 
with the U.S., and of its composition involving the exchange of unprocessed 
raw materials for manufactured goods, were rejected by U.S. officials with 
the ( theoretically eorr-ect) observations that what matters is the glo'bA.l 
balance of payments and that there is nothing basically wrong with trading 
raw materials for manufactures. It is then mildly mind-blowing to read that 
the U.S. has been using exactly the Latin American arguments regarding U.S. 
trade with Japan. 
19. Within the Latin American context see in particular Albert O. Hirschman, 
"How to Divest in Latin .America, and Why:~." Essays in International Financ!ta. 
Princeton University, Number 76, November 1969, and Paul N. Rosenstein-Roden, 
"Multinational Investment in the Framework of Latin American Integration," 
-4-
in Multinational Investment in the Economic Development and Integration 
of Latin .America (Inter-American Development Bank, 1968). See also Charles P. 
Yale University Press,Kindleberger, .American Business Abroad (Hew Haven: 
1969), especially Lecture 6, and Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay, ~ 
Basic Books, Inc. 1971).Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (New York: 
20. The candid line of reasoning is as follows: 
The offending host government might always calculate that 
by.genes will be bygones if it waits long enough .•.To complicate 
matters, other countries may not have suffered at all from the 
defaults of a non-paying host government, and will be far quicker 
to forgive past misbehaviour; their companies would then enjoy a 
handsome advantage in that country if their guarantee schemes 
started giving cover there again. AlL.iof which points to the 
need for a multilateral investment guarantee scheme operated 
collectively by all OECD members, such as the World Bank is 
now chewing over. 
The quote is from an article entitled 
11 From gunboats to insurance" in 
The Economist, November 6, 1971. 
21. The specter of collusion among major industrialized countries became 
tangible during the most recent Algerian-French dispute, when it looked 
as if the U.S. gave in to French pressure and thr-eatened to block U.S. 
imports of Algerian liquefied natural gas until Algeria settled with 
France. But fortunately for LDC's, differences of interests and l'ivalries 
among the rich appear stronger than their desire for a joint venture as 
reflected in the following exerpts from an editorial in The Wall Street 
Journal (June 18, 1971): 
High-handed treatment by producing countries of 
international oil companies is not something the United 
States would want to encourage .•.Still, there are serious 
questions about whether the U.S. government should pass 
judgement on a dispute between Algeria and France .•.The 
United States will •badly need fuel in the years ahead. 
